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STRIKES BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: THE
CONSEQUENCE OF LEGISLATIVE
INATTENTION
INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether or not California public employees
have the right to strike has drawn widespread debate. Despitejudicial indications that the legislature has not granted this
right to public employees, strikes in the public sector do in
fact occur and in great numbers. During the period from 1970
to 1974, there were seventy-two strikes by public employees in
California. This figure more than doubled between the years
1975 to 1978.1
The figures cited above are indicative of increasing labor
militancy among public employees and a demand for the same
rights afforded workers in the private sector. They also call
into question traditional arguments that the right to strike is
unnecessary and inappropriate in the public sector.' Nonethe-
less, the strike weapon is still considered by some observers
the most threatening possible consequence of public employee
collective bargaining. Opponents of collective bargaining in
the public sector argue that the civil service system offers an
adequate alternative and that public welfare and safety would
be jeopardized if the government were subject to the demands
of labor organizations. Although increased public employee
organizing and militancy have influenced state legislatures
and local governments to adopt public sector labor policies
granting limited bargaining rights to public employees, legisla-
tion in most jurisdictions governing public employee labor re-
lations still denies the right to strike.
In California, the right to strike question has been tossed
back and forth between the legislature and the courts. Legis-
© 1980 by Laura V. Best.
1. Bogue & Stern, A 1977-78 Tabulation of Strikes in California's Public Sec-
tor, 40 CALIFORNIA PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS 20 (March, 1979). There were 44
strikes by California public employees in 1975; 20 in 1976; a high of 60 in 1977; and
27 strikes in 1978.
2. Haemmel, Government Employees and the Right to Strike-The Final Nec-
essary Steps, 39 TENN. L. REv. 75 (1971-72).
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lation governing public employee bargaining rights contains
no express grant or denial of the right to strike." As a result,
the judiciary has assumed, albeit reluctantly, the task of for-
mulating labor relations policy with respect to this issue.
Many public employee organizations have argued emphatical-
ly before the courts that a right to strike may be implied in
the absence of express prohibition by the legislature. The Cal-
ifornia courts of appeal, however, have declined to confer such
a right in the absence of express legislative intent.4 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court has refused to address this question at
all, thus leaving the issue of strike legality essentially open.'
This comment first examines the historical and political
background to the present controversy surrounding the strike
issue. Second, it analyzes the merits and deficiencies of the
legislative and judicial pronouncements regarding the ques-
tion of strike legality in the public employment sector. The
primary focus is on public school employee relations because
the history and current status of public school teachers' col-
lective bargaining rights illustrate the rights gained by state
and local public employees in general. Of key importance in
this discussion is the Rodda Act' that grants limited collective
bargaining rights to public school employees. Like the Mey-
ers-Milias-Brown Act 7 that governs labor relations for public
employees in general, the Rodda Act contains no provision re-
garding the right of public school employees to strike. Yet
teachers, more than any other group of public employees,
have a history of strong labor militancy and a high level of
strike activity. Moreover, teachers are a particularly signifi-
cant segment of the public work force because they constitute
3. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3511, 3540 (West 1980).
4. See San Diego Teachers Association v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d
838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979); Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of
Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 104, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977), hearing denied; City and
County of San Francisco v. Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1977),
rehearing denied; Crowley v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 450,
134 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1976), rehearing denied, 1977; Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v.
United Teachers-Los Angeles, 24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1972), re-
hearing denied; Almond v. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr.
518 (1969), rehearing denied, 1969, petition denied.
5. See note 4 supra.
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1980). This Act is also referred to as
the "Educational Employment Relations Act." For the sake of consistency, this com-
ment will refer to it as the "Rodda Act."
7. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-3511 (West 1980).
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a large percentage of total government employees.8 Finally,
the comment advocates legislative alternatives aimed at
achieving the goal of fair and effective resolution of public
sector labor disputes.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING
In the past decade there has been increased application of
private sector collective bargaining practices to public em-
ployees. The rights to organize, bargain collectively, and pro-
cess and arbitrate grievances have been acquired by govern-
ment workers through legislation and judicial decision. In
spite of these gains, however, collective bargaining rights for
public employees still lag far behind those granted to workers
in the private sector. In order to understand the current sta-
tus of public employee labor relations, it is necessary to review
the theories used historically to distinguish public employees
from their counterparts in the private sector.
Sovereignty
One of the underlying bases for the traditional omission
of government employees from legislation providing collective
bargaining was the concept of state sovereignty. According to
the sovereignty theory, the government has authority that
cannot be delegated. Proponents of the sovereignty theory ar-
gue that all decision-making power rests with the government
and should not be shared with labor unions.9 This idea is also
used as a foundation for the policy against strikes by public
employees; President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated:
A strike of public employees manifests nothing less than
an intent on their part to obstruct the operation of gov-
ernment until their demands are satisfied. Such action,
looking toward the paralysis of government by those who
have sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable
* . . [M]ilitant tactics have no place in the functions of
any organization of Government employees.10
8. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1978 (99th ed. 1978).
9. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 Du-
QUESNE L. REV. 357, 358-361 (1971-72).
10. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to L.C. Stewart, President of the Na-
1980]
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Other government officials have maintained that collective
bargaining rights would have an adverse impact on govern-
ment by infringing on management perogatives, weakening
authority, and breaking down the efficiency of government op-
erations."1 It is clear today, however, that the sovereignty ar-
gument is not a valid justification for denying collective bar-
gaining rights to public employees. The growth of unions
during recent decades simply has not posed a threat to effi-
cient government operations. Moreover, the historical concept
that "the King can do no wrong" offers little practical guid-
ance in the formulation of labor policies concerning public
employees.
Civil Servants
A second theory closely related to the sovereignty doc-
trine is the concept of public employees as "civil servants." As
this term implies, the attitude toward government employees
traditionally has been that they must sacrifice their own inter-
ests to the public good unlike their counterparts in private in-
dustry. Traditionally, there was concern that extension of col-
lective bargaining rights to public employees would endanger
the operation of such essential government service as police
and fire protection and health care. This theory was applied
by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in McAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford.1 ' Declaring that no individual has a right to be
a policeman, he stated that a "city may impose any reasonable
conditions on holding offices within its control."1 " Holmes
concluded that a city rule prohibiting policemen from joining
a certain political committee was among such reasonable
conditions.
The number and kinds of public services created by legis-
lation to meet the expectations and needs of the public have
obscured the distinctions between government and private
employment. Further, the increasing numbers and decreasing
average age of public employees have contributed to changing
the image of civil servants as a professional elite.14 The natu-
tional Association of Federal Employees (August 16, 1937), reprinted in Vogel, What
About the Rights of the Public Employees? 1 LAB. L. REv. (1950).
11. Edwards, supra note 9.
12. 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
13. Id. at 220, 29 N.E. at 518.
14. The total number of government employees increased from 6,402,000 in
[Vol. 20948
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ral result is that public employees are no longer willing to
waive collective bargaining rights for the privilege of public
service and now demand job security and benefits comparable
to those enjoyed by their private sector counterparts.
Economic Pressures
Another principal argument used to deny collective bar-
gaining rights to public employees is based upon what has
been perceived to be the unique position of government as an
economic and political entity." Under this view, there has
been particular emphasis upon one fundamental difference
between government and private industry: the former is not
governed by the same economic pressures as the latter. In the
private sector, the law of supply and demand for goods and
services acts as a constraint on the cost of labor. Union de-
mands for higher wages result in higher costs of production
and higher prices in the market which, in turn, lead to a de-
crease in demand for the higher priced products with resulting
lower demand for labor in the affected industry. This reality
offsets the power of labor to demand increased wages. It is
argued, however, that this built-in limit on wage rates is not
found in the public sector because the demand for publicly
provided services does not vary with the cost of production.
The government employer is not able to pass on increased la-
bor costs to consumers except through revenue increases. This
relative lack of free market pressures, it is feared, gives public
employee unions too much bargaining power and leads to un-
reasonable union demands."
Growth of the Public Sector
During the period that federal legislation governing labor
relations in the private sector was enacted, 7 a far-reaching
1950 to 15,012,000 in 1976. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES 1977 at 306 (98th ed. 1977).
15. Edwards, supra note 9, at 361-62.
16. Id. at 362.
17. Congressional passage of the Wagner Act in 1935 established the right of
private sector workers to bargain collectively. 49 Stat. 449-57 (1935) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1976)). The Taft-Hartlby Act, passed by Congress in 1947,
defined the duty of collective bargaining as the mutual obligation of employers and
unions to reach bilateral agreements. 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 29 U.S.C.). Both are obligated to meet at reasonable times and to confer in
1980]
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metamorphosis was occurring in the public work force. Ini-
tially, the number of public employees was small and these
civil servants enjoyed a relatively high status in society.
Traditional attitudes toward public employment began to
erode as government expanded into a greater range of activi-
ties. The growth of the federal payroll can be traced, for ex-
ample, from the 240,000 civilians employed at the turn of the
century' s to 559,000 federal employees by 1932.19 By 1969,
there were 12.7 million public employees, of which 9.7 million
were employed by state and local governments. 0 In the past
twenty years, local and state government employment has in-
creased six times faster than federal employment."' By 1976,
nearly twenty percent of the national labor force was govern-
ment employed. And in 1977, there were 13 million state and
local government employees and 2.6 million federal
employees.2
A corresponding increase in union organizations has oc-
curred in the public sector at all levels. Since 1972, union
membership among public employees has increased by ten
percent.' s In 1977, thirty-six percent of these employees were
union members." This rapid growth of public employee
unionism in the United States has prompted many state and
local governments to alter their labor policies. Forty-two
states now have statutes or policies governing labor relations
in the public sector. 5 In thirty-three states and the District of
Columbia, the right of state and local government employees
to bargain collectively is granted by statute, judicial decision,
attorney general opinion, or executive order. 6
good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. Due to policy considerations previously discussed, however, federal, state, and
local governments were exempted from the definition of "employer." Public employ-
ees were thus denied the labor rights guaranteed to workers in the private sector.
18. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES
710-11 (1960).
19. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEPT OF LABOR, HANDBOOK OF LABOR
STATISTICS 1967, at 56 (Bull. No. 1555, 1967).
20. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT IN
1969, at 1-2 (Series GE 69 No. 1, 1969).
21. McCart, Public Worker: Handy Scapegoat, 83 AFL-CIO AMERICAN FEDERA-
TIONIST 11 (1976).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. [1978] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 41:245.
26. Id.
950 [Vol. 20
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Although the adoption of collective bargaining laws for
public employees would appear to represent an attempt to ex-
tend rights afforded private employees, a notable departure
from this trend is seen in the treatment of the right to strike.
At present, few states permit strikes by public employees or
even allow some limited form of strike.27
STRIKE ACTIVITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Although strikes in the public sector are prohibited in
most states, 28 few public employee organizations refrain from
threatening to strike or actually striking.29 The number and
duration of strikes by public employees have increased and
legislatures and courts have been unsuccessful in fashioning
satisfactory alternatives to the strike.30
The number of worker-days of idleness per year due to
strike activity in the public sector has also increased. The av-
erage number of lost worker-days per year rose to 50,000 be-
tween 1958 and 1965 and to 1,525,556 per year between 1966
and 1976.1 The peak year for strike activity was 1970, in
which 2,023,200 days were lost.32
Most public employee strike activity occurs at the local
level. In 1976, for example, approximately ninety-four percent
of public employee strikes were conducted by local govern-
ment employees, 3 with over fifty percent occurring in public
education." During the same year, strikes in schools ac-
counted for fifty-seven percent of all workers involved in
strikes by government employees and sixty-four percent of
worker-days lost due to strike activity.83
27. These states include Alaska, Hawaii, Minnesota, Montana, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See AFL-CIO Public Employee Department,
State Public Labor Relations Laws (January 1, 1978).
28. Id.
29. [1980] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 71:1014.
30. The number of strikes by public employees increased sharply in the 1960's.
From 1958 to 1965, the number of strikes averaged only approximately 29 per year;
the average number of strikes increased, however, to 332 per year between 1966 and
1976. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 71:1017.
35. Id.
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Teacher Strikes
Currently, there are almost three million people em-
ployed in public and private elementary and secondary
schools." Between 1960 and 1963, there was an average of
four teacher strikes per year nationwide; 7 this number in-
creased to twenty-one between 1964 and 1967. The average
number of strikes reached 144 per year from 1968 to 1976.8
Recent statistics show, however, that the number of
teacher strikes has begun to decline. An unofficial National
Educational Association (NEA) strike survey, released during
an NEA convention in July 1978, revealed that there were 152
strikes by teachers nationwide in 1977-1978.39 Of these, 121
walkouts were by NEA affiliates, twenty-eight by the Ameri-
can Federation of Teachers, and three by the American Asso-
ciation of University Professors. 40 This number was well below
the peak number of teacher strikes (229) recorded in 1975.41
NEA attributed this dropoff in strike activity primarily to the
increasing bargaining sophistication of teachers, coupled with
increasing acceptance on the part of school boards of the real-
ity that collective bargaining cannot be avoided. 2 As a further
indication that bargaining was working in most cases, NEA
noted that ninety-nine percent of all local teacher groups did
not strike during the period studied. 8
At the same time the NEA report was released, the Asso-
ciation proposed alternatives to prohibitions against strikes.
In a resolution on strike activities passed at the convention,
the NEA declared that "the chances of reaching voluntary
agreement in good faith are reduced when one party to negoti-
ations has the power to use the court system unilaterally
against the other party" by obtaining injunctions against
strikes and imposing fines on striking teachers. In order to
resolve an impasse in bargaining, the NEA recommended me-
diation, factfinding, binding arbitration, political action, and
36. [1977] GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFEREMCE FILE (BNA) 41:103.
37. [1975] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 71:1055.
38. Id; [1980] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 71:1017.
39. [1978] Gov'T EMPL. Rm. REP. (BNA) 768:14.
40. Id.
41. [1980] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. REFERENCE FILE (BNA) 71:1017.
42. [1977] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 725:18.
43. [1978] Gov'T EMPL. REL. REP. (BNA) 768:14.
44. Id.
952 [Vol. 20
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strike "if conditions make it impossible for teachers to pro-
vide quality education. '45
CALIFORNIA TEACHER STRIKES
The Limited Effectiveness of Current Impasse Procedures
In an attempt to deal with the problems arising out of
increased teacher unionism and militancy, the California leg-
islature in 1975 adopted the Rodda Act,46 which recognized
the right of teachers to organize and bargain 4 and established
a Public Employment Relations Board (PERB).48 In addition,
the Rodda Act, although ignoring the issue of right to strike,
provided impasse procedures, specifically mediation and
factfinding.49 These mechanisms have a useful and necessary
function in the bargaining process, particularly in the public
sector. Factfinding can serve to delineate the limits of unset-
tled issues as well as factual and policy considerations essen-
tial to a fair compromise, with due regard for the public inter-
est. Mediation facilitates the bargaining process, helping to
restore an atmosphere of cooperation and clarifying the pro-
posals of opposing parties. Mediation can also serve to deline-
ate the issues remaining in dispute and the range and scope of
differences between the parties' positions.
A crucial problem with these two mechanisms, however,
lies in the fact that the recommendations made by mediators
and factfinders may not be acceptable to the principal parties.
If either party finds the recommendations unacceptable, the
impasse continues. Since the Rodda Act provides no further
procedure, a strike is often the only alternative.
Although it is probably too soon to gauge the overall ef-
fect of the Rodda Act on teacher strikes, available data indi-
cates that the number of strikes by public school teachers has
continued to increase since its passage. Prior to the enactment
of the Act, there had been a total of thirty-seven teacher
strikes in California, the first one occurring in 1968.50 There
45. Id.
46. CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 3540-3549.3 (West 1980).
47. Id.
48. Id. § 3541.
49. Id. §§ 3548-.8.
50. Staff, Unionization of Municipal Employees: The California Experience 6
CALIF. PUBLIC EMPLOYEE REPORTS 120 (Inst. reprint 353, 1971).
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were nine strikes by public school teachers in 1975, six strikes
in 1976, eighteen strikes in 1977,51 and twenty-three strikes in
1978.52 And closer examination of the strikes occurring under
the Rodda Act reveals the relative ineffectiveness to date of
its impasse provisions. A study of sixteen strikes in the public
schools from July 1, 1976, (the effective date of the Rodda
Act) to March 15, 1977, concludes that impasse procedures
were not fully utilized in any of the strikes.5" The failure of
bargaining agents to utilize statutory provisions for resolution
of conflicts further calls into question the effectiveness of the
Act in achieving its stated purpose of "promot[ing] the im-
provement of personnel management and employer-employee
relations within the public school systems in the state of
California ... ""
A task force composed of staff members from various
state legislative committees was appointed by the legislature
in 1977 to review the effectiveness and implementation of the
Rodda Act." In a report submitted to the legislature in June
1978, the task force noted a consensus among teachers that
"the entire impasse procedure [is] of greater benefit to school
boards than [teachers]."" The task force also found that im-
passe procedures had not been fully utilized because teachers
generally believed that the time required for mediation and
factfinding was too long. 7 Furthermore, bargaining conflicts
were reportedly intensified by unrealistic expectations of what
collective bargaining could accomplish under the Rodda Act."
School boards regarded the legislation as an usurpation of
board control; teachers, on the other hand, regarded collective
bargaining as a mechanism to obtain contracts covering all ed-
ucation-related matters. The task force concluded that these
51. Staff, Strikes of Certified Employees: 1972-77, 36 CPER 21-22 (1978).
52. Bogue and Stern, supra note 1, at 22.
53. Currier, A Case Study: 16 Public School Job Actions and the Use of Im-
passe Procedures, 33 CPER 16 (1977).
54. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3540 (West 1980).
55. Staff, Recent Developments in California Public Jurisdictions, 37 CPER
40, 67 (1978).
56. The report noted that negotiations were further complicated by the problem
of ascertaining available school financial resources; school boards sought, for example,
to delay wage offers until projected property tax revenues were apparent while teach-
ers preferred to conclude negotiations before the end of the school term. Id. at 67.
57. Id. at 68.
58. Id.
954 [Vol. 20
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distorted views would lead to inevitable confrontations.es
In sum, it is likely that teachers will resort to strikes less
frequently as experience with bargaining increases and all
parties acquire a more realistic view of the provisions of the
Rodda Act. It is apparent, however, that the absence of ex-
press statutory authority for a right to strike has had little
effect on the incidence of strikes.
Judicial Interpretation and Avoidance of the Strike Legality
Question
Although the California courts of appeal have held that
strikes by public employees are illegal in the absence of ex-
press legislative authorization," the California Supreme
Court, as noted earlier, has not yet addressed the issue. The
court repeatedly denied review to appellate decisions holding
that such strikes are illegal, but'in 1979 it relented."1 In a con-
troversial 4-3 decision, however, the court again reserved opin-
ion on the legality of public sector strikes."
In San Diego Teachers Association v. Superior Court,as
approximately 3,000 teachers in the San Diego Unified School
District went on strike to express their dissatisfaction with
the manner in which contract negotiations were progressing."
The school district obtained a temporary restraining order
against the strike and was granted a preliminary injunction
prohibiting teachers from engaging in an "illegal work stop-
page." 5 After the injunction was issued, both parties filed un-
fair practice charges against each other" with PERB's prede-
cessor, the Education Employment Relations Board.7 The
59. Id.
60. See note 4 supra.
61. San Diego Teachers Association v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d
838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979).
62. Id. at 7, 593 P.2d at 842, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 897. See generally, Bowen, Su-
preme Court Strike Case-Injunction Authority Shifts to PERB, 41 CPER 2 (1979).
63. 24 Cal. 3d 1, 593 P.2d 838, 154 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1979).
64. Staff, Recent Developments in California Public Jurisdictions, 34 CPER 37
(1977).
65. 24 Cal. 3d at 3, 593 P.2d at 840, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 895. See Staff, supra note
64, at 7.
66. 24 Cal. 3d at 3, 593 P.2d at 840, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 895. The unfair practice
charges were filed pursuant to Government Code section 3541.5 which gives PERB
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether charges of unfair practices are justified,
and, if so, what remedies are appropriate. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3541.5 (West 1980).
67. Prior to January 1, 1978, PERB was known as the Education Employment
1980]
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trial judge issued contempt orders against the Association and
its president, Hugh Boyle, for conducting the strike in viola-
tion of the temporary restraining order.
The issue presented to the California Supreme Court was
the propriety of the restraining order and injunction in view
of the possibility that PERB, pursuant to the Rodda Act, may
have sole jurisdiction over the dispute." The court examined
three questions essential to resolution of this issue: 1) whether
PERB had authority to declare that the strike was an unfair
practice under the Rodda Act; 2) whether PERB could pro-
vide relief equivalent to relief obtained through court action;
and 3) whether the legislature intended to grant exclusive ju-
risdiction to PERB over strikes determined to be unfair
practices.69
The supreme court held that a strike could be found an
unfair practice on two possible grounds: refusal to negotiate in
good faith as required by Government Code section
3543.6(c), 0 or refusal to participate in the impasse procedure
provided by section 3543.6(d).71 In reaching the first conclu-
sion, the court noted that a strike in the private sector does
not itself constitute a failure to bargain in good faith since it
is a well-recognized bargaining tool.7 2 Thus, the court stated
that if a public employee "strike were held legal it would not
constitute a failure to negotiate in good faith. As an illegal
pressure tactic, however, its happening could support a find-
ing that good faith was lacking. ' 7 3 As the dissent pointed out,
the court indirectly shifted authority to PERB to validate a
public strike simply by failing to enjoin it.74 In view of the
Relations Board.
68. 24 Cal. 3d at 3, 593 P.2d at 840, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
69. Id. at 7, 593 P.2d at 842, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
70. Section 3543.6(c) provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employee organiza-
tion to: (c) Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good faith with a public school
employer of any of the employees of which it is the exclusive representative." CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 3543.6 (West 1980).
71. Section 3543.6(d) provides: "It shall be unlawful for an employee organiza-
tion to: (d) Refuse to participate in good faith in the impasse procedure set forth in
Article 9 (commencing with Section 3548)." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.6(d) (West 1980).
72. 24 Cal. 3d at 8, 593 P.2d at 843, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
73. Id. (emphasis in original).
74. The dissent expressed criticism of this portion of the majority decision,
stating:
The majority thereby indirectly accomplished precisely the result which
the legislature so carefully and specifically sought to prevent-the con-
ferral of a right to strike on public school employees. Therefore, despite
[Vol. 20
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court's own reluctance to address the issue of public employee
strike legality, this apparent deference to PERB authority is
surprising. It is questionable whether PERB does have au-
thority to declare a strike illegal when the legislature and the
courts have thus far declined to decide the issue.
In discussing the second ground upon which a strike may
be declared an unfair practice, the refusal to participate in
impasse procedures, the court referred again to the possibility
that strikes in the public sector may be lawful: "An unfair
practice consisting of 'refus[al] to participate in good faith in
the impasse procedure' . . . could be evidenced by a strike
that otherwise was legal.' '75
Turning to the issue of whether PERB could provide re-
lief equivalent to that available in the trial court,76 the court
found that the Rodda Act gives PERB implied authority to
issue a complaint and then to petition the court for an injunc-
tion.7 In reply to the school district's argument that PERB's
decision to seek an injunction would reflect only a "narrow
concern for the negotiating process . . . and would ignore
strike-caused harm to the public and particularly the infringe-
ment on children's rights to an education, '7 8 the court gave
some instruction of its own:
That argument erroneously presupposes a disparity be-
tween public and PERB interests. The public interest is
to minimize interruptions of educational services. Yet did
not an identical concern underlie enactment of the
EERA? The Legislature was aware of the increase in pub-
lic employee work stoppages despite the availability and
use of injunctions and other sanctions to prevent or pun-
ish them . . . It does not follow from the disruption at-
the majority's declaration that it leaves the "question" of public strikes
open for future decision, the public as employer seeking to enjoin such
strikes may henceforth find the courtroom doors firmly closed.
Id. at 21, 593 P.2d at 851, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 906.
75. Id. at 8, 593 P.2d at 843, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 898 (emphasis added).
76. The court pointed out that finding equivalent relief was necessary in order
to require the school district to exhaust administrative remedies under the Rodda Act
before seeking judicial relief. Id. at 9, 593 P.2d at 843, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
77. Id. Although section 3541.3 authorizes PERB to "petition the Court for
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order... only [u]pon issuance of a com-
plaint charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair practice,"
the court interpreted this provision as granting PERB the implied authority to issue
complaints upon its own initiative. Id. at 9, 593 P.2d at 843, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 898.
78. Id. at 11, 593 P.2d at 845, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
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tendant on a teachers' strike that immediate injunctive
relief and subsequent punishment for contempt are typi-
cally the most effective means of minimizing the number
of teaching days lost from work stoppages. . . Harsh, au-
tomatic sanctions often do not prevent strikes and are
counterproductive. PERB's responsibility for administer-
ing the EERA requires that it use its power to seek judi-
cial relief in ways that will further the public interest in
maintaining the continuity and quality of educational
services.7'
The court thus indicated that PERB, although it has the au-
thority to do so, should not seek judicial sanctions each time a
public employee strike occurs. Instead, the court encouraged
PERB to try alternative means to resolve labor disputes in
order to further the "public interest." Yet the decision stops
short of specifying what types of relief it should seek to
achieve the goal of reducing strikes while minimizing labor
strife. Perhaps the court believed this issue, like that of strike
legality, is one best left to legislative resolution. In any event,
the decision does not clearly define the role PERB should
play in future labor disputes.
The court next examined the issue of whether PERB has
exclusive jurisdiction over remedies against strikes it finds are
unfair practices.80 In deciding that PERB has such jurisdic-
tion, the court rejected an argument raised in an amicus brief
that PERB's initial jurisdiction extends only to unfair prac-
tices and not to strikes.8" An explanation of the argument re-
quires discussion of several provisions of the Rodda Act.
Government Code section 3541.5 vests exclusive jurisdic-
tion in PERB over unfair practices. 82 A separate provision,
section 3549, states that the Rodda Act "shall not be con-
strued as making the provisions of section 923 of the Labor
Code applicable to public school employees." 83 Labor Code
section 923 gives workers the right to engage in "concerted
79. Id.
80. Id. at 12, 593 P.2d at 845, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 900.
81. Id. at 12-13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901. Section 3541.5 provides
in pertinent part: "The initial determination as to whether the charges of unfair prac-
tices are justified, and, if so, what remedy is necessary to effectuate the purposes of
this chapter, shall be a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the board." CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 3541.5 (West. 1980).
82. Id.
83. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3549 (West 1980).
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activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection"" without employer interference. As the
court pointed out, section 923 has been construed as confer-
ring a right to strike."
Amicae contended that a strike violates section 3549 and
since section 3541.5 gives PERB initial jurisdiction only over
unfair practices, PERB has no jurisdiction over stirkes. The
court disposed of this argument on two grounds: First, the
court pointed out "section 3549 does not prohibit strikes but
simply excludes the applicability of Labor Code section 923's
protection of concerted activities."" Second, the court con-
cluded since the Rodda Act does not specify "unfair prac-
tices" but only "unlawful" acts, there is no distinction be-
tween an unfair practice and any other violation of the Act.87
Finally, the court declined to decide the issue of whether
the school district would have been without a remedy had
PERB decided not to seek either injunctive relief or to issue
an unfair practice complaint." The court did, however, state
its view on the limited usefulness of court injunctions in curb-
ing strike activities and again emphasized the need for PERB
to employ alternative forms of relief:
But the EERA gives PERB discretion to withhold as well
as pursue, the various remedies at its disposal. Its mission
to foster constructive employment relations [section 3540]
surely includes the long-range minimization of work stop-
pages. PERB may conclude in a particular case that a re-
straining order or injunction would not hasten the end of
a strike (as perhaps neither did here) and, on the con-
trary, would impair the success of the statutorily man-
dated negotiations between union and employer. A court
enjoining a strike on the basis of (1) a rule that public
employee strikes are illegal, and (2) harm resulting from
the withholding of teachers' services cannot with exper-
tise tailor its remedy to implement the broader objectives
entrusted to PERB.8
After concluding that PERB has exclusive initial jurisdic-
84. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1976).
85. 24 Cal. 3d at 6, 593 P.2d at 842, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
86. Id. at 13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tion to decide whether a strike is an unfair practice and what
remedies, if any, should be pursued, the court limited its hold-
ing to "injunctions against strikes by public school employee
organizations recognized or certified as exclusive representa-
tives . . .,, '
The dissent. Justice Richardson, joined by Justices Clark
and Manuel, attacked the majority's decision in unusually
strong language, declaring that "we owe the public a full ex-
planation of whatever rights and remedies, if any, it retains to
protect itself."' 1 The dissent then proceeded to review prior
decisions concerning the legality of public employee strikes.
In Los Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority v. Broth-
erhood of Railroad Trainmen, 9 the court held that transit au-
thority employees had the right to strike since the act creating
the transit authority provided that employees should have the
right to bargain collectively and to engage "in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection."" The right to strike was implicit in
this statutory language and was declared a necessary and "in-
tegral part of the bargaining process.""
The dissent in San Diego Teachers Association, however,
highlighted other language in Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority: "[I]n the absence of legislative authoriza-
tion public employees in general do not have the right to
strike. . ... " The dissent argued that several courts of ap-
peal opinions issued subsequent to Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority have relied on this statement in concluding
that California's public employees have no right to strike."
Such reliance on the statement seems misplaced, however, in
light of the fact that it was made in the context of an opinion
in which the court held that transit authority employees did
have the right to strike in spite of the absence of clear statu-
tory language granting the right.
In arguing that public employee strikes are unlawful, the
dissenters also noted that lower court opinions issued subse-
90. Id. at 14, 593 P.2d at 847, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
91. Id. at 15, 593 P.2d at 847, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 902 (Richardson, J., dissenting).
92. 54 Cal. 2d 684, 355 P.2d 905, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1960).
93. Id. at 692, 355 P.2d at 913, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 687, 355 P.2d at 908, 8 Cal. Rptr. at 2.
96. 24 Cal. 3d at 15, 593 P.2d at 847, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
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quent to the adoption of legislation governing public employee
relations have generally found there was no intent on the part
of the legislature to authorize strikes;97 the courts have con-
cluded that the absence of explicit authorization indicates leg-
islative intent to prohibit strikes in the public sector.98
Another case in point is Almond v. County of Sacra-
mento." In Almond, public employees sought to compel the
county civil service commission to rescind its decision to dis-
miss striking employees. 100 The court of appeal relied on Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority in holding that the
Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMB) °'0 did not expressly grant
public employees the right to strike.102 In reaching this con-
clusion, the court emphasized that Labor Code section 923,
permitting employees to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining free from employer interfer-
ence, was specifically excluded from MMB. 10° The court as-
serted that the exclusion of this statutory language from
MMB implied the denial of the right to strike.1 0 4 The Almond
court noted, however, that even if collective bargaining lan-
guage was included in the legislation, a right to strike was not
thereby conferred.1 '" Thus, the court in Almond offered no
clear statement as to what type of language would demon-
strate a legislative intent to authorize strikes by public
employees.
The dissent in San Diego Teachers Association quoted
extensively from the court of appeal opinion in City of San
Diego v. American Federation of State, County & Municipal
Employees106 in which the city appealed an order denying its
application for a temporary injunction restraining city em-
ployees from engaging in a strike.10 Relying in part on the
decision in Almond v. County of Sacramento, the court of ap-
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969), hearing denied.
100. Id. at 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
101. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3500 (West 1980).
102. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 38, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
103. A provision of Meyers-Milias-Brown states: "[t]he enactment of this Chap-
ter shall not be construed as making the provisions of Section 923 of the Labor Code
applicable to public employees." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3509 (West 1980).
104. 276 Cal. App. 2d at 35, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
105. Id. at 35 n.2, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 520 n.2.
106. 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970).
107. Id. at 309, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
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peal held that the rule established by previous cases was con-
trolling and that no statute in California authorized public
workers to strike.108 In so holding, the court stated:
The common law rule [that] public employees do not
have the right to bargain collectively or to strike is predi-
cated expressly on the necessity for and lack of statutory
authority conferring such right. Where a statute autho-
rizes collective bargaining and strikes it includes them
within the methods authorized by law for fixing the terms
and conditions of employment. Those who advocate the
right of public employees to strike should present their
case to the legislature. 1"9
As in Almond, the court in City of San Diego offered no
clear guidance as to what language would confer a right to
strike. Moreover, the court's position that the right to strike
must be conferred by express language is arguably unsound;
the right to strike has been granted to employees in the pri-
vate sector on the basis of judicial interpretation of legislation
providing general collective bargaining rights for private sec-
tor workers.110
Of particular significance to the dissent in San Diego
Teachers Association was Pasadena Unified School District
v. Pasadena Federation of Teachers,"' in which the appellate
court held that a school district could recover damages from a
striking teachers' union. The court in Pasadena Unified found
that the teachers' association induced the teachers to breach
their employment contract, giving rise to damage liability. In
this regard, the court stated: "[T]he Legislature has consist-
ently withheld from teachers the right to strike. The obliga-
tion not to interrupt or deny services on the basis of a strike
is, therefore, a term of plaintiff's contract with each of its
teachers." 13 The court's award of damages was also based on
its theory that an unlawful strike is a tort for which damages
may be recovered.118
The court in Pasadena Unified did note, however, that
labor unions are privileged to induce breach of employment
108. Id. at 316, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
109. Id. at 313, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62.
110. Id. at 310, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 259.
111. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977), hearing denied.
112. Id. at 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
113. Id. at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
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contracts or to interfere with contractual relationships by en-
gaging in concerted activities, insofar as the object and the
manner of the activity are legal.1 1' Nonetheless, the court
found that it was bound by prior case law holding that public
employee strikes in California are illegal per se. Although the
court conceded that "[t]here is no square holding of our Su-
preme Court passing upon the legality of strikes by public em-
ployees," " it relied on the supreme court's statement in Los
Angeles Metropolitan Transit Authority that in the absence
of legislative authorization, public employees do not have the
right to strike.l! 6 The court noted further that the Rodda Act,
like MMB, withholds application of Labor Code section 923
from public school employees.1 17 Since section 923 guarantees
workers in the private sector the right to engage in "concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mu-
tual aid or protection,"' 18 the court concluded that the exclu-
sion of a similar provision from the Rodda Act indicated an
intent of the legislature to "retain the existing rule making
public employee strikes unlawful."' 9
The San Diego Teachers Association dissent agreed with
the conclusions reached by the court in Pasadena Unified,
declaring:
We unanimously denied a hearing in the Pasadena case.
If there are lurking majority reservations regarding an im-
portant principle of law which has been treated as settled
for so long, surely there is an obligation to set forth those
views openly and candidly." 0
According to the dissent, the lower court decisions have
established "without equivocation" that public sector strikes
are unlawful in California.' The dissent was critical of the
majority's reluctance to address this issue, stating:
[D]espite past unanimity of judicial opinion on the sub-
ject, the majority finds it "unnecessary here to resolve the
question of the legality of public employee strikes ..
114. Id. at 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 47.
115. Id. at 105, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 106, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 923 (West 1971).
119. 72 Cal. App 3d at 107, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 45.
120. 24 Cal. 3d at 18, 593 P.2d at 849, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
121. Id. at 14, 593 P.2d at 847, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
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Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however, there re-
mains no such "question" to decide, for prior cases which
have carefully and thoughtfully analyzed and resolved the
issue have ruled that public employee strikes are unlawful
in the absence of legislation to the contrary. 2 '
The majority countered, however, that the issue of strike le-
gality was expressly left open in City and County of San
Francisco v. Cooper,"2 8 a case that involved the validity of leg-
islative measures granting salary increases to striking public
employees.1 24 A taxpayer challenged those measures, contend-
ing that adoption was forced by an illegal public employee
strike." 5 The court held that "[i]n the absence of applicable
constitutional, legislative, or charter proscriptions, a duly en-
acted legislative measure cannot be invalidated on the ground
that it was enacted as a result of an illegal strike. '' 26
The Cooper court refused, however, to resolve the contro-
versy concerning the legality of public sector strikes. Although
it briefly considered arguments raised by the employee unions
that present legislation governing public employees could be
read so as to implicitly authorize public sector strikes by not
expressly prohibiting them,1 27 the court stated that it was not
necessary to resolve this controversy in the present case. 1 8
The dissent's reliance on the above-mentioned appellate
decisions is not compelling. Those decisions that have de-
clared strikes by public employees illegal under California law
have reached a conclusion that is arguably correct but inade-
quately grounded. They appear to follow blindly the incorrect
notion that express statutory authority is required to legiti-
mize the public employee strike. Yet, the case that every court
of appeal cites for this proposition, Los Angeles Metropolitan
Transit Authority, actually held to the contrary. In reality, it
seems that a right to strike can be implied from certain lan-
guage, i.e., language granting collective bargaining rights or
the right of employees to engage in concerted activities. More-
over, the courts have not yet addressed the question of
122. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
123. 13 Cal. 3d 898, 534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 904, 534 P.2d at 407, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
126. Id. at 911, 534 P.2d at 411, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 715.
127. Id. at 912, 534 P.2d at 411-12, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
128. Id. at 912, 534 P.2d at 412, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
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whether the right to strike may be implied from other statu-
tory language. In particular, no court has examined whether
the Rodda Act contains language implying the right of public
school teachers to strike. Because the legislation governing
public school teachers does not contain an express prohibition
against strikes, it can be argued that a right to strike is im-
plicit, although parallel arguments have not fared well thus
far. By declining to address this issue in San Diego Teachers
Association, the majority opinion actually raises more ques-
tions than it answers.129
The role PERB will play in future strikes by public em-
ployees is not yet well-defined. In the aftermath of the San
Diego Teachers Association decision, PERB received numer-
ous requests to intervene in either ongoing or potential strikes
by public school employees. From April through June 1979,
PERB was asked to seek injunctive relief in six strike-related
incidents.180 By the end of the year, PERB had received a to-
tal of thirty-seven requests for injunctive relief, half the num-
ber of such requests received during the first three years of
the Board's existence. 81
In response to the San Diego Teachers Association decla-
ration that the Rodda Act gives PERB "discretion to with-
hold, as well as pursue, the various remedies at its disposal,"
and that "PERB's responsibility for administering the EERA
requires that it use its power to seek judicial relief in ways
that will further the public interest,'' PERB has attempted
to employ alternative means for resolving labor disputes in
lieu of traditional forms of judicial relief. 8
129. See Bowen, supra note 62, at 7. As the dissent there pointed out, it is not
clear whether an employer may seek court relief if PERB either declines to seek in-
junctive relief or to issue an unfair practice complaint against striking employees.
Also left unanswered is the issue of whether PERB has been given the authority to
impliedly authorize a strike by refusing to act. On the other hand, it is not clear
whether PERB has the authority to declare that a public employee strike is illegal.
The court indicated that such a finding may be a prerequisite to finding a refusal to
bargain in good faith. Thus far, PERB has avoided confronting this issue by deciding
unfair practice cases on the basis of a refusal to participate in impasse procedures,
the second ground listed by the court as applicable to a public employee strike
situation.
130. See Filliman, Enjoining School Strikes-A New Direction for PERB, 44
CPER 2, 3 (1979).
131. 4 PutLic EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS REPORTER No. 10, 5 (January, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as PERR].
132. 24 Cal. 3d at 13, 593 P.2d at 846, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
133. PERB has, for example, declined to seek injunctions in situations where a
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In spite of PERB's attempts to implement creative proce-
dures to resolve public school disputes, PERB has been
harshly criticized by representatives of both labor and man-
agement. '" On the one hand, school employees would prefer
that PERB attempt to resolve disputes at the bargaining table
rather than seek judicial relief; on the other, school district
officials would favor court injunctions without PERB involve-
ment.185 The court in San Diego Teachers Association clearly
hoped that PERB jurisdiction would result in fewer strikes. In
fact, the opposite has occurred, for there were ten teachers'
strikes in California within four months after publication of
the decision.196 Yet PERB has been unfairly blamed because
it is clear that the court's decision only served to underscore
the legislature's failure to enact comprehensive legislation de-
lineating the rights of employees in the public school system.
The Rodda Act, like most state public employee labor rela-
tions statutes, stops short of effective dispute resolution
mechanisms and fails to deal adequately with the strike issue.
Furthermore, the strike issue is central since, although long-
range benefits may be secured by workers, a strike harms all
parties including the striker. The threat of a strike is there-
fore a potent influence on both sides for maintaining order at
the bargaining table and reaching mutually acceptable terms.
Statutory provision of alternative mechanisms for resolving
disputes, however, would increase the opportunity of avoiding
strike action altogether.
ALTERNATIVES
Some alternatives to the full right to strike exist, and
while it is not within the scope of this comment to deal in
depth with such alternatives, the reader should be aware of
the potential benefits of interest arbitration and non-stoppage
or graduated strikes. 1 7
Interest arbitration is a desirable alternative to the strike
strike has merely been threatened. PERR, supra note 131. In several cases, PERB
appointed state mediators and conducted informal conferences in order to forestall or
curtail strike action. Filliman, supra note 130, at 7-8.
134. PERR, supra note 131.
135. Id. at 5-6.
136. Id. at 4.
137. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike in Public Labor Relations, 85
HARvARD L. Rzv. 459 (1975).
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since it protects employees from the heavy costs of a strike'
by providing for an arbitrated settlement of disputes in the
negotiation of new contracts.18 9 Moreover, interest arbitration
provides a more reasonable atmosphere for settlement since
the arbitrator, a neutral third party, serves as a substitute de-
cision-maker without the loss of bargaining leverage by one
side and not the other. Where both parties agree to abide by
the arbitrator's decision, the outstanding issues can be deter-
mined within the parameters of the proposals of each side, in-
cluding consideration of relevant criteria for protecting the
public interests.14 0 All interests are better served by arbitrated
agreements than by those agreements reached before or after
a strike.
Other alternatives to conventional strikes are the non-
stoppage or the graduated strikes.4 1 During a non-stoppage
strike, employees continue to work as usual, but both the em-
ployees and the employer are required to contribute a portion
of the wages, otherwise payable, to a special fund. Although
this arrangement pressures both parties to reach a settlement,
there is no disruption of public services.14' In a graduated
strike, employees reduce their number of working hours and
suffer comparable reductions of wages. This mechanism exerts
more direct pressure on the employer and on the community
than does the non-stoppage strike, since the quantum of ser-
vices is reduced. It avoids, however, the shock of a complete
shutdown of services.14 8 If the law offered these types of alter-
natives to the conventional strike, disruptions caused by
strikes would be reduced and the public's need for govern-
ment services and the government's procedures for allocating
resources would be better accommodated.1 44
CONCLUSION
Strikes by California public school teachers illustrate
common issues and problems in the public employment sector
that result from inadequate legislative provisions for dispute
138. Id. at 466.
139. Id. at 459.
140. Id. at 467.
141. Id. at 469.
142. Id. at 475.
143. Id. at 474.
144. Id. at 475.
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resolution and from failure to effectively use impasse mecha-
nisms that are available. Moreover, California public school
employees, particularly teachers, have organized and
politicized their demands with the strike tool more often and
in larger numbers than other groups of local or state
employees.
Many states have enacted labor laws aimed specifically at
public employees but the legislation to date is less than com-
prehensive and it is inadequate to resolve long-range practical
problems which result from impasse at the bargaining table.
Moreover, the issue of the right to strike as a bargaining tactic
remains unresolved with respect to most public employees.
Although public employee organizations may be subject
to liability for strike damages or fines, the question of the le-
gality of a strike becomes almost academic when a strike does
occur. Pronouncing strikes unlawful merely adds to the strife
and hostilities, precipitating disregard and contempt for the
law and drawing adverse reactions from the public and from
the employees. Since fines and damage awards increase the
costs and risks to employees, the scope of the strike often in-
creases as the stakes rise and the parties are less able to save
face or effect a reasonable settlement. Without effective alter-
natives, it is unrealistic to expect strike activity to subside.
Prohibiting strikes has not prevented them. Legalizing
them, on the other hand, need not result in proliferation
since, in reality, the ability to reach satisfactory agreements
depends on the relative economic strength of each party at
the bargaining table. Absent a right to strike, public employ-
ees remain in a disadvantaged position. A statutory frame-
work of comprehensive and effective mechanisms for dispute
resolution, however, might also lessen the frequency and dura-
tion of strikes or forestall impending strikes.
The public has a basic interest in the outcome and con-
duct of public sector bargaining and consequently it has an
interest in effective statutory machinery to govern the bar-
gaining process. The legislature neglects its duty when it
avoids the problems of impasse and abandons those problems
to the judiciary by failing to enact comprehensive labor legis-
lation. The key to elimination or significant reduction of
strikes is the adoption of a labor policy for public employees
that will achieve the goal of providing peaceful and effective
[Vol. 20
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methods for dispute resolution while granting both sides equal
bargaining power during negotiations.
Laura V. Best

